The snowden drop coukd be useful, even in encrypted form.
Assume you are travelling in the uk. And, you know your electronics are likely to be seized for imaging. Of course, during the shakedown phase, password are “drawn from you”.
Now let’s say that the password guard is an rsa secureid type one time password (changing each 60s, that is). And its available at a pin guarded site, whose video stream shows code of the minute.
The pin one gives is part of a zero knowkedge scheme, mixed with a dead mans drop protection scheme. Use the pin, and snowdens encrypted files are distributed further – increasing the risk that they will be decrypted. At one site they are distributed at rate r, and at another site rate r’.
Normally, on e observes the securid device directly – without triggering the distribution.
Of course access to the soace with the device (and camera….) need a bio control, leveragng ones bio passport (which is in the uk, by definition).
since this is all public information (and readily handed over upon instigation of uk duress), the goal is to measure how well folks can spoof bio and crypto of the passport chip.
Contibue this chain of drops, each time forcing the need to reveal a core social deception, undermining years of assumed return on the elaborate design, to hide the deceptive technique in full view. The cost of a little uk shakedown by the thugish end of the eton entry class has to have ramifications much wider than the uk, inducing reaction from the smarter etonites – now worried about retaining their class privileges.