So how does the CIA get back to the US the data that its illegal taps on German routers obtain? One assume that its by radio link – in high-burst mode, at very high bandwidth.
So assuming next that what we have in commodity products and telco services is what NSA/CIA had 15 years ago, let’s look at how my 4G phone delivers IP services now.
ON downloading xamarin, the MAC is wifi connected to a phone – that is talking 4G protocols to Verizon (the spying company) that routes packets via the internet or private link to Google – that supplies packets at a rater controlled by the usual flow control mechanisms.
Of course, the wireless link between phone and cell tower is where we need to focus. What properties – now see in commodity high-bandwidth internet via phone – WOULD HAVE BEEN leveraged 15 years ago when enabling the exfil of data from compromised routers?
One has to be leveraging the early forms of CDMA – so that it appears like noise. And, one has to “playing it big” – meaning that data rates we see as normal today were THEN perceived to be impossible (but they were not…). To minimise detection, one wants the noise channels to be seen as commercial data (should anyone happenstance detect them), and one wants them in high burst mode (to avoid creating suspicion, in the first place).
If one looks at Iran, these days, one has to assume that many of the radio transceivers placed in the compromised devices are “getting old” – and bar a new CIA-burglary to retreive the devices – are ripe now for modern code-breakers to “go looking” for the tell tales signs of the means used to RECOVER the data.
We also have to recall that what a spy MOST wants is easy access to the codes and keys – via taps placed on the device itself – not for the device itself to supply the data. One should assume that taps on cables or radio intercepts are providing the raw intercept capability for the data being enciphered.